UVIC Philosophy Students' Union

Here is the Abstract for Sam Girmwarnauth from Grand Valley State University:

This paper aims at briefly sketching, first, the foundations for the possibility of having an ethical theory. My overarching concern and argument is that the foundations of ethics is metaphysical; we must understand the principles of human nature before we can theorize about human action and place value upon those actions. In this paper, then, I attempt to clarify the key element and lynch-pin of this understanding; namely, what is the human soul. I do not use the term as such to any great extent, but rather focus on what in philosophy we call “primary substance”. If ethical theory is possible then there must be some aspect of the human person that is shared in common with all other persons, and this I argue is the nature of each persons primary substance. In the Aristotelian tradition it has always been understood that each person is an individual within a set type or kind; that is, that the kind is shared in common. This shared commonality allows for a common ethics. This is traditionally understood as a type of Metaphysical Realism. Recent work in the field, however, has sought to treat Aristotle as a Metaphysical Nominalist: the idea that there are no shared characteristics. If this is the case, then the project of ethical theory loses its foundation. This is one of the major issues with contemporary and modern ethical philosophy, which is Nominalisitic, and the outcomes of this view have been highly detrimental to the field of ethics (as well as metaphysics). The principles of this discussion extend to such fields as legal philosophy and jurisprudence, among others.

I attempt, second and for the majority, to defend the Realist reading of Aristotle by presenting a careful assessment of the Nominalist arguments and responses to them. I present a close reading of the text and critically examine what I see as faults in the traditional Realist understanding, and propose an alternative understanding and reading. My aim is to demonstrate that Aristotle, and the Aristotelian tradition, cannot coherently be understood to be Nominalistic. Further, I point out how a Nominalist metaphysics negates any possibility for a comprehensive and coherent ethical system.  With this accomplished, we have a vindicated foundation upon which to build ethical theory.

Here’s also a little bit about Sam and his interests:

“I am a senior philosophy major at Grand Valley State University in western Michigan. I have been the president of the Philosophical Society here for two years now and my focus has been to present philosophy as deeply practical for life, even as a way of living. This latter is a great concern for me, and I find inspiration in the Ancients and the Stoics in that regard. My chief interests are in moral theory, specifically Virtue Theory (and more properly virtue ethics) and Natural Law Theory. I find that the two work best when in harmony with each other. To that end, I stand in the Aristotelian tradition of both value theory and metaphysical theory, and find most of my answers in studying the great medieval scholastics. Aristotle and Aquinas have been the chief influences upon my thought. New interests, in direct relation to this, are the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers (such as Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid).”