UVIC Philosophy Students' Union

Here is Angella Yamamoto’s (University of Alberta) abstract for “Could Reasons for Belief Undermine Earl Conee and Richard Feldman’s Evidentialism?”

In this essay I focus on Earl Conee and Richard Feldman’s version of evidentialism. In particular I attempt to distinguish between evidence and reasons for belief and then attempt to assess the consequences of this distinction for Conee and Feldman’s theory. In order to work within the framework of evidentialism, I note that my distinction between evidence and reasons for belief can be linked to two forms of evidence hinted at within Conee and Feldman’s argument for upholding an internalist view of epistemic justification. In assessing the consequences of this distinction I find that Conee and Feldman do not see the problem with their internalist argument and Feldman’s rejection of authoritarian epistemology. The problem is that it seems reasons for belief must be rejected on the basis that they stem from authoritarian epistemology and therefore cannot be used to argue for an internalist viewpoint. I suggest then that they could solve this problem by explaining that while reasons for belief can be used as evidence, they are insufficient on their own to fully justify a belief.